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DOI 10.1016/j.stem.2011.11.009In Bru¨stle v. Greenpeace, the German
Federal Court of Justice asked the Court
of the European Union (CJEU) to define
what is meant by the term ‘‘human em-
bryos’’ in Article 6(2)(c) of the European
Parliament and Council Directive on
the legal protection of biotechnological
inventions (European Union, 1998). The
Directive considers unpatentable uses of
human embryos for industrial or com-
mercial purposes. The question explicitly
addressed two techniques to isolate
human embryonic stem cells (hESCs):
somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) and
induced parthenogenesis. Both methods
were developed years before induced
pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs) were made
by direct reprogramming with embryonic
transcription factors (Takahashi et al.,
2007).
The CJEU defined the concept of
human embryos broadly, since the
European Union legislature intended to
exclude any possibility of patentability
in situations that could potentially affect
the respect for human dignity (Court of
Justice of the European Union, 2011).
Accordingly, the Grand Chamber of the
CJEU ruled ‘‘any human ovum after fertil-
ization, any nonfertilized human ovum into
which the cell nucleus from a mature
human cell has been transplanted, and
any nonfertilized human ovumwhose divi-
sion and further development have been
stimulated by parthenogenesis constitute
a ‘‘human embryo’’ (Court of Justice of the
European Union, 2011). The CJEU ex-
plained, ‘‘although organisms have not,
strictly speaking, been the object of fertil-
ization, due to the effect of the technique
used to obtain them they are, as is ap-
parent from the written observations pre-
sented to the CJEU, capable of com-
mencing the process of development of
a human being just as an embryo created502 Cell Stem Cell 9, December 2, 2011 ª20by fertilization of an ovum can do so’’
(emphasis added; Court of Justice of the
European Union, 2011).
The Use of Ova
The CJEU’s definition of human embryos
explicitly mentions the use of human
ova. Sidestepping the necessity of using
human ova for the procurement of human
pluripotent stem cells thus seems an
important ethical and biological distinc-
tion. The generation of iPSCs was indeed
hailed by many as a solution to the ethical
challenges faced by human embryonic
stem cell researchers (Sipp, 2009). But
the so-called solution comes with its
own set of ethical worries, such as the
informed consent and privacy of tissue
donors, and features a potential variation
on human cloning: using reprogramming
to generate human eggs and sperm (Zar-
zeczny et al., 2009). Instead of focusing
on the differences among the materials
deployed by these techniques, the CJEU
ruling equates cells with human embryos,
a definitional misstep that contorts our
common understanding of developmen-
tal biology.
Defining Potential
European authorities and patent offices
have continuously denied patents on hu-
man totipotent cells (European Commis-
sion, 2005). In common biological par-
lance, totipotency refers to the ability of
a cell to make the embryo proper and
extraembryonic tissues necessary to sup-
port its development, such as the pla-
centa and amnion. Pluripotent cells
make the many different types of cells,
tissues, and organs of the embryo. A
pluripotent stem cell’s potential becomes
progressively restricted as it differentiates
into different embryonic lineages. Further-
more, even the most primordial of mam-11 Elsevier Inc.malian cells—including sperm and egg—
need a biological context to develop fully;
a live birth is the result of the subtle inter-
play of collections of cells, their genetic
signaling pathways, and the local environ-
ments in which they reside. With this in
mind, an essential question in determining
pluripotency asks whether a cell can con-
tribute whole or in part to a fully developed
organism. Injecting murine IPS cells into
tetraploid embryos can produce viable
mice derived from the reprogrammed
cells, satisfying an in vivo test (Kang
et al., 2009; Zhao et al., 2010).
To bypass its troubles with biological
terminology, the CJEU seemingly re-
frained from using the term totipotent
and instead used the descriptive criterion
of a cell’s ‘‘capability of commencing
the process of development of a human
being.’’ Broadening the criterion ignores
the scientific subtleties of human devel-
opment and ignores the actions taken in
order to prove a cell can commence the
process of human development.
Proving Capability
Transplanting hESCs and iPSC into
mouse embryos can also produce live
chimeric animals. Cloned mammals have
been produced, as have animals born
using tetraploid complementation. That
these results alone seem to satisfy the
CJEU’s silent standard of proof that cer-
tain types of cells classify as human em-
bryos is deeply troubling. The CJEU’s
definition of capability would seem to
extend to new technologies designed to
overcome the very ethical concerns the
court is trying to avoid. The CJEU, strug-
gling to avoid the semantic traps of
potency, has instead based its decision
on a broad teleological definition, namely,
‘‘capability.’’ In fact, it is the latent ge-
netic potential of any cell—totipotent,
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pitulate the development of the organism.
Tellingly, the CJEU remained silent on
how the differentiation potential of embry-
onic and embryonic-like stem cells should
be proven in practice. It is obvious that
capability of commencing the process of
development of a human being should
only be proven indirectly, either through
in vitro experiments or in vivo animal
models. Human parthenotes are not de-
velopmentally viable. Reproductive clon-
ing is universally condemned and is illegal
in most countries. Local, national, and
international guidelines prohibit placing
human embryonic stem cells in primate
blastocysts. Positive proof of in vivo
totipotency or pluripotency in humans
would clearly be a form of unethical hu-
man experimentation. Such experiments
would require interuterine implantation of
manipulated or chimeric human embryos,
as would experiments using embryos
made from iPSC-derived egg and sperm.
In sum, the CJEU ruling seeks to impose
a moral code while ignoring both the bio-
logical context necessary for true pluripo-
tency and the existing normative ethical
and regulatory frameworks developed to
guide human stem cell science.
CJEU as the Guardian of Human
Dignity
Though not directly addressed in the
CJEU judgment, the question whether ornot human iPSCs fall under the definition
of human embryos will presumably be
the subject of another reference for a
preliminary ruling in future patent law
case. But, as we have argued elsewhere,
the mere potential of pluripotent stem
cell types is not a sufficient reason to ex-
clude them from patent protection (Vrto-
vec and Vrtovec, 2007).
However, it is becoming evident that
the CJEU is extending the definition of
human dignity to entities that in no way
resemble fertilized human embryos await-
ing potential implantation into a female
uterus via in vitro fertilization. SCNT by-
passed the need for sperm cells, and
direct reprogramming avoided the need
for ova. What we have been left as a start-
ing material are the trillions of somatic
cells found in every individual. Now, even
these cells are caught by an overbroad
and ill-conceived ruling.
If the CJEU continues with its definition
of human embryos, and regenerative
medicine outside Europe produces more
successful results, rebalancing existing
equilibrium between promises and perils
of stem cell research seems inevitable.
Human dignity is a noble concept, but
it is as useful insofar as it is concerned
with the well-being of actual human
beings. Europe should focusmore on pro-
tecting the human dignity of terminally
ill patients eagerly awaiting novel stem
cell treatments than on safeguarding theCell Stem Cell 9,human dignity of each and every somatic
cell in our body.REFERENCES
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